Introduction
Superior or command responsibility 1 is the primary mechanism through which superiors can be held criminally responsible for failing to prevent or punish crimes committed by their subordinates. The concept is an important tool in punishing those in superior positions for lack of supervision over persons under their command or authority. It extends to military and non-military (political, civilian) superiors. This liability theory was already described by Hugo Grotius when he wrote, "we must accept the principle that he who knows of a crime, and is able and bound to prevent it but fails to do so, himself commits a crime". 2 In one sentence Grotius captured the essence of superior responsibility.
Prior to the Second World War, superior responsibility was an articulation of military practice. 3 This accounts for the term command responsibility. A position of command generally imposed military-disciplinary responsibility 4 , only in a few cases did it entail criminal liability. 5 International adjudication in the twentieth century, in * Professor of Criminal Law, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. The author wishes to thank Chantal Meloni who played an essential role in drafting this chapter. All mistakes remain the author's. 1 Command responsibility and superior responsibility are used here as interchangeable concepts. A lot has been written on command responsibility.
12 This contribution will not go into all the aspects of this liability theory, nor will it discuss the concept in great detail. It will reflect on 15 years of ICTY case law and by necessity remain at a relatively general level. the Čelebići case ( §2). The analysis focuses on the temporal scope of command responsibility, discussing the case law with regard to 'successor superior responsibility' ( §2.1) 13 . The analysis continues with describing how the scope of article 7(3) has been extended in recent case law by adopting a broad interpretation of the terms 'commission' and 'subordinate' ( §2.2). The latter development, raises the question as to the limits of command responsibility, which brings us back to the question of the nature of command responsibility: what is a superior actually held responsible for?( §3) To answer the latter question command responsibility outside the ICTY context will be analysed ( §4), in international criminal law, most particularly the ICC Statute ( §4.1) and national law ( §4.2). Discussing command responsibility in national and international criminal law enables us to reflect on its layered structure ( §5). Moreover, it assists in understanding the nature of command responsibility at the ICTY ( §6) and in suggesting limits to its scope ( § 7).
Command Responsibility beyond the Čelebići case
Analysis of ICTY case law on command responsibility shows that we can detect a division into first, second and third generation cases. 15 The fact that these views emerged relatively late into the ICTY's existence is because command responsibility as a liability theory was for a long time ignored by the prosecutor who favoured Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) as a basis of liability. This had to do with the fact that command responsibility, certainly in early cases, has been regarded as narrowly defined, requiring a close link between superiors and subordinates, which was unappealing for a prosecutor seeking to secure convictions
Čelebići.
The overview of ICTY case law that follows is limited to second and third generation case law. We will start by discussing the divisive Hadžihasanović ruling on successor superior responsibility.
Successor Superior Responsibility
On the basis of superior responsibility we punish inactivity. 16 Thus, with superior responsibility a military or non-military superior is held responsible for a failure to act.
This failure can consist of two scenarios: (i) the superior knew, or has reason to know, that crimes were about to be committed and failed to prevent such crimes, or (ii) the superior did not know of crimes being committed (and cannot be blamed for that lack of knowledge) but once informed failed to punish and/or report such crimes to the proper authorities. In other words, there is a pre-crime and a post-crime scenario of superior responsibility. It follows from the decision by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in as a failure to act rather than as a mode of liability.
I prefer to interpret the provision as making the commander guilty for failing in his supervisory capacity to take the necessary corrective action after he knows or has reason to know that his subordinate was about to commit the act or had done so. Reading the provision reasonably it could not have been designed to make the commander a party to the particular crime committed by his subordinate.
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Judge Hunt argued along similar lines. He pointed out that the specific factual situation in
Hadžihasanović falls under the principle of command responsibility and that successor superior responsibility may, therefore, be regarded as part of customary international law.
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He further relied on a purposive reading of article 86(2) of API to argue that post-crime command responsibility without temporal coincidence falls under articles 86(2) API and 7(3) of the Statute. As to the nature of command responsibility he found that, [t] he criminal responsibility of the superior is not a direct responsibility for the acts of the subordinate. It is a responsibility for his own acts (or, rather omissions) in failing to prevent or to punish the subordinate when he knew or had reason to know that he was about to commit acts amounting to a war crime or had done so. acceptance by the Trial Chamber of multiple superior responsibility.
Multiple superior responsibility implies a remote link to the perpetrators. In the view of the Appeals Chamber judges in Orić, this in itself is irrelevant as long as there is "effective control", i.e. the material ability to prevent the crime or punish, over the subordinate. The appellate judges held that it does not matter "whether the effective control descends from the superior to the subordinate culpable of the crime through intermediary subordinates"
37
. It was felt that whether the superior indeed possesses effective control is a matter of evidence and not one of substantive law.
38
In the Karadzić indictment, the ICTY Prosecutor charged the latter for crimes on the basis of multiple superior responsibility. 39 The Prosecutor has taken the Appeals
Chamber's words in Orić to heart and explicitly charged Karadzić on the basis of article 7(3) for crimes committed by subordinates, who are themselves liable under article 7(3). 
The meaning of 'subordinate'
By now it is accepted in ICTY case law that the direct perpetrator does not have to be a subordinate of the superior. In the words of the Trial Chamber in Orić:
The direct perpetrators of a crime punishable under the Statute (do not need to) be identical to the subordinates of a superior. It is only required that the relevant subordinates, by their own acts or omissions, be criminally responsible for the acts and omissions of the direct perpetrators.
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In at least two cases before the ICTY the question arose whether a superior can be held responsible for acts of 'unidentified' subordinates. The judges in Hadžihasanović held that in establishing the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship, it is important to be able to identify the alleged perpetrators. This does not mean that the perpetrator needs to be identified exactly. It is sufficient to specify to which group the perpetrator belonged to 36 Orić Appeal Judgment, supra note 24, para. 39. 37 Ibid., para. 20 et seq. In the view of the Appeals Chamber the link of the accused to the crime was remote. It held that the Trial Chamber failed to establish the level of control, if any, that the accused exercised over the principal perpetrators. 38 Ibid. 39 Karadzic (IT-95-5/18-PT) Third Amended Indictment, para. 35. 40 See for further elaboration on superior responsibility for superior responsibility Meloni, supra note 12. 41 Orić Judgment, supra note 11, para. 478.
and to prove that the accused exercised effective control over that group.
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The Trial Chamber in Orić went one step further when it held that a superior may be held liable for crimes committed by 'anonymous' persons. This ruling was, however, quashed on appeal mainly because it was found that the Trial Chamber had failed to determine that Orić knew or had reason to know that crimes had been or were about to be committed. With regard to the only subordinate that was identified, the Appeals Chamber held that the failure to determine on which basis the subordinate was found responsible, invalidated the conviction of Orić as a superior.
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Taken together this means that a superior can be liable for crimes committed by an anonymous perpetrator as long as the perpetrator can be identified by his/her affiliation to a group/unit, there is effective control over the subordinate(s), and it is clear on which basis the latter is (are) responsible for such crimes.
Observations
The appellate decision in Hadžihasanović with regard to successor superior responsibility affirmed existing ICTY case law on command responsibility. The connection between a culpable subordinate and a culpable superior as a result of the same crime suggests that the superior is responsible for the crime committed by the subordinate(s) and should be punished for it. Moreover, in Čelebići, the Appeals Chamber rejected a 'separate offence interpretation' of Article 7(3) with regard to knowledge element (the duty to know). The wording, especially the clause 'where necessary' suggests that the primary task of a commander is to prevent violations of the laws of war. The duty to suppress and report are subsidary and seem concomitant to that primary task. This is confirmed by the 48 As the Čelebići Appeals Chamber ruled with regard to a neglect of a duty to know: "It is however noted that although a commander's failure to remain appraised of his subordinates' action, or to set up a monitoring system may constitute a neglect of duty which results in liability within the military disciplinary framework, it will not necessarily result in criminal liability". Čelebići Appeal Judgment, supra note 8, para. 226. 49 An example is article 41 of the German Military Criminal Code (MCC) stipulating that a commander is punished for failing to supervise or properly delegate supervision over his subordinates, which results in grave consequences such as 'unlawful subordinate behaviour'. The German Code of Crimes against International Law (CCAIL) provides for command responsibility as a violation of a duty to supervise Article 1 para. 13) and/or report crimes in Article 1 para. 14. is even more so with multiple superior responsibility. Particularly, the latter can be regarded as a concept that stands at odds with the principle of culpability.
Exploring the limits of command responsibility, inevitably requires understanding its nature. What exactly is a superior blamed for when he/she is held liable on the basis of command responsibility? This seems a straightforward question to which there must be a straightforward answer. Not so, as the following makes clear.
The Nature of Command Responsibility in ICTY law
The debate on the nature of command responsibility -is it a mode of liability or a separate offence -was triggered by the Hadžihasanović interlocutory decision. Yet, to date there is ambiguity as to what command responsibility at the ICTY really means.
One indication of what the nature of command responsibility at the ICTY is, can be found in the charges and the sentencing. Pursuant to article 7(3) the superior is held responsible for the same crime as his subordinate, which would qualify command responsibility as a mode of liability. In more recent case law, however, doubts have arisen 52 Ibidem, p. 135 -136. 53 Van Sliedregt, supra note 7, section 5(iii)(b).
as to the meaning of the expression "responsible for the crimes of his subordinates". In the Halilović case the Trial Chamber interpreted 'responsible for' as an expression that " [d] oes not mean that the commanders shares the same responsibility as the subordinates who committed the crimes, but rather that….the commander should bear responsibility for his failure to act". 54 In Orić, the superior was found to be responsible "merely for his neglect of duty with regard to crimes committed by subordinates". 55 The accused was, therefore, found guilty not of the crimes committed by his subordinates (murder and cruel treatment) but of "failure to discharge his duty as a superior". 56 With this change in ICTY jurisprudence, comes a change in formulation. The superior is not "responsible for" but "responsible in respect of" or "with regard to" the crimes of subordinates. These pronouncements, however, have not affected sentencing practice; superiors are still convicted of the underlying/base crime. By emphasizing that the two conditions are cumulative, the Appeals Chamber confirmed that superior responsibility at the ICTY is more than a superior's failure to prevent or punish; it extends to subordinate wrongdoing as well. Whether the superior is actually blamed for that conduct, in the sense that it is attributed to him, or whether the subordinate's crime is merely a point of reference in sentencing, is not clear.
The most recurrent characterization of superior responsibility in ICTY case law is that of a "sui generis responsibility for failure to act" 59 , a formula that has the value of clarifying that superior responsibility under article 7(3) is distinct from the modes of liability under 7(1).
Still, it does not elucidate the nature or type of superior responsibility. At best, one could say that superior responsibility is recognised as a hybrid form of liability, combining aspects of a mode of liability and a separate offence liability. This, however, is unsatisfactory. The meaning of the constitutive elements of superior responsibility and terms, such as 'commission' and 'subordinate' in Article 7(3), hinge upon how one views superior responsibility. 60 The superior-subordinate relationship can be less proximate when superior responsibility is regarded as a separate offence where the sentence/punishment is not also based on the underlying crime. In other words, with a separate offence interpretation one can afford to loosen the linkage between superiors and subordinates and adjust the sentence accordingly. The problem with the above-discussed broadening of superior responsibility in third generation case-law is that the linkage to subordinate wrongdoing has been loosened while punishment is (still) based on it.
Command Responsibility beyond the ICTY
In pursuing the quest of understanding the nature of command responsibility at the ICTY, and hence pronounce on its scope and outer limits, it is instructive to look at command responsibility beyond the ICTY framework. Superior responsibility can take many shapes and forms.
International Law
The Statutes of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) provide for superior responsibility in a similar way as the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR do. The concept is framed as a corollary of subordinate liability or, in the words of Mettraux, as an "exclusionary clause". 61 The Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), on the other hand, defines command responsibility in positive terms, as a separate 'ground of criminal responsibility'. In the following, we will take a closer look at Article 28. Bemba views it as an alternative when the commander does not have the power to punish:
Article 28 of the ICC Statute
The Chamber wishes to point out that the duty to punish requiring the superior to take the necessary measures to sanction the commission of crimes may be fulfilled in two different ways: either by the superior himself taking the necessary and reasonable measures to punish his forces, or, if he does not have the ability to do so, by referring the matter to the competent authorities. Thus, the duty to punish (as part of the duty to repress) constitutes an alternative to the third duty mentioned under article 28(a)(ii), namely the duty to submit the matter to the competent authorities, when the superior is not himself in a position to take necessary and reasonable measures to punish. 63 One could, however, argue that 'repress' and 'submit to the proper authorities' are distinct in their underlying duty. Since 'repress', rooted in Article 86 and 87 API, is closely linked to the prevent-scenario, it can be seen as based on a reactive duty with regard to past crimes. As such it would accord with the 'punish' alternative in article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute. 'Submitting to the competent authorities', on the other hand, could be regarded as related to the future where the failure to submit to authorities is blameworthy for its potential to trigger future crimes (by creating a culture of lawlessness). 64 Here the duty to report is incumbent upon the superior who exercised effective control at the time when the report should have been made; not necessarily at the time when the crimes were committed.
This type of liability could be regarded as encompassing successor superior responsibility. The structure of article 28 is rather complex. The provision encapsulates two omissions.
There is a general omission in the 'chapeau', phrased as a 'result crime' through the explicit causal link (a superior is liable when he fails "to exercise control properly" as a result of which crimes have been committed) and a more specific omission in subparagraphs (a)(ii) and (b)(ii) (he/she "failed to take all measures…to prevent or repress or submit the matter to the competent authorities"). Both the general/chapeau omission and the specific omission -at least when it concerns the element 'knew'-need to be interpreted in accordance with article 30 of the Statute, which contains a default rule for the mental element.
When the commander has knowledge of the underlying crimes and fails to prevent these crimes, the two omissions coincide. The fact that a superior failed to prevent or repress crimes while he knew of them, implies that he failed to exercise control properly, which resulted in the commission of a crime. Here superior responsibility qualifies as a mode of liability (by omission) where a superior knowingly participates in subordinate's crimes by failing to prevent or repress them. As such, this type of superior responsibility is closely related to complicity/criminal participation.
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When the superior lacks knowledge and 'should have known', the two omissions of article 28 cannot be aligned in the same way. A negligent failure to intervene cannot easily be combined with intentional subordinate liability. Ambos refers to it as 'a stunning contradiction between the negligent conduct of the superior and the underlying intent crimes committed by the subordinates'. 71 A way out of this illogical impasse would be to regard superior responsibility as a separate offence, a 'failure to supervise'. 72 Consider Schabas' statement with regard to superior responsibility and the crime of genocide.
Indeed, even the ICC will probably be required, in practice, to treat command responsibility as a separate and distinct offence. In the case of genocide, for example, it is generally recognized that the mental element of the crime is one of specific intent. It is logically impossible to convict a person who is merely negligent of a crime of specific intent. Accordingly, the Court, if Article 28 of the Statute is to have any practical effect, will be required to convict commanders of a crime other than genocide, and one that can only be negligent supervision of subordinates who commit genocide. The compromise solution would be to view negligent superior responsibility as generating liability for a failure to exercise control properly where the (intentional) subordinate crime is a point of reference that triggers liability and provides a basis for determining the sentence. Nehrlich formulates it somewhat differently. In his view, negligent superior responsibility provides for parallel liability: it regards the subordinate crime as well as the superior's failure to act. 75 The superior can be blamed for the subordinate's crime as a wrongful consequence of his failure to act, even if it was an unintentional result of that failure to act.
National Law
According to Werle command responsibility is "an original creation of international criminal law". 76 While the concept may be seen to originate from (national) military law, it has indeed been developed as a criminal law concept in the case law of international courts. With the adoption of the ICC Statute and its implementation at the national level, many States now provide for command responsibility in their domestic legal systems.
German ICC implementing legislation 77 contains three provisions relating to command responsibility and identifies it by its nature and blameworthiness. A superior who intentionally (knowingly) omits to prevent the commission of crimes deserves the same punishment as the subordinate (article 1 para. 4(1)) and can be qualified as an accomplice, whereas the failure to supervise the subordinate (article 1 para. 13) and report crimes (article 1 para. 14) are separate crimes of omission that carry more lenient sentences than intentional Anyone who culpably neglects to take measures, in so far as these are necessary and can be expected of him, where he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a subordinate has committed or intends to commit such an offence, shall be liable to no more than two-thirds of the maximum of the principal sentences prescribed for the offences referred to in para. 2. Noteworthy are the provisions on command responsibility in U.S. military law.
Paragraph 5-1 of the Field-Manual 27-10 (FM 27-10) of the US Army Manual, provides for negligence liability:
The commander is (…) responsible if he has actual knowledge or should have knowledge, through reports received by him or through other means, that troops or other persons subject to his control are about to commit or have committed a war crime and he fails to take the necessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance with the law of war or to punish violators thereof. 84 Article 77 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) -that unlike FM 27-10 does not apply to enemy nationals -is much stricter. A superior is punishable "as principle" when he "commits an offense...or aids, abets, counsels, commands or procures its commission" or when he "causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him". 85 Comparing paragraph 5-1 of FM 27-10 to Article 77 UCMJ, it is clear that the latter requires positive personal participation, which implies actual knowledge of the crimes committed by subordinates. In fact, the Manual for Courts-Martial, which reads as a Commentary to the UCMJ, explains that a "mere failure to prevent the commission of an offense" is not enough to create culpability; "there must be an intent to aid or encourage the persons who commit the crime". 86 Article 77 UCMJ penalises encouragement through inaction and qualifies it as complicity. Deviating from classic complicity law, however, the superior who is held liable under 77 UCMJ is considered a principal rather than a secondary party. for Dutch and German law where lesser penalties express the lower moral responsibility that attaches to negligence as a fault degree.
Another lesson that can be drawn from the overview of national and international concepts of command responsibility, concerns the nature of superior responsibility. By codifying command responsibility as a separate offence of negligence, national legislatures have found an elegant solution to the incoherence of negligent liability for intentional crimes.
It is noteworthy that command responsibility is difficult to characterize in terms of national criminal law theories. Command responsibility does not readily fit the classic model of Anglo-American complicity law where the superior is an acomplice who participates in the subordinate/principal's crime. In deviating from complicity law, article 77 of the UCMJ specifically refers to a superior as 'principal' as did the UK ICC Bill (that was later changed back to classic complicity terminology).
Command Responsibility as Parallel Liability
Returning to the question of the nature of command responsibility in the ICTY context, the picture becomes clearer, especially when we compare article 7(3) to article 28 of the ICC Statute. Superior/command responsibility is most unproblematic, in an intentional ('knew') pre-crime variant. As such it easily fits the complicity format and qualifies as a mode of liability. It fits the complex wording of article 28, with its two omissions and an explicit element of causation. Also at the ICTY, this form of command responsibility fits the wording of 7(3) and the interpretation in case law, especially the first generation cases. Having said that, as a result of a broad interpretation of words such as 'commission'
and 'subordinate' in article 7(3), there also exists a gap at the ICTY between superior and subordinate liability. The superior and subordinate relationship, an important element of command responsibility, has been loosened, which makes attribution of subordinate's crimes to the superior difficult. It is against that background that we must understand the attempt of the Hadžihasanović Trial Chamber to interpret article 7(3) as a separate offence (failure to supervise) which carries a lower sentence than the principal/underlying crime.
The previous leads to two observations. First of all, command responsibility can be detached from subordinate liability in two ways: (i) through lack of knowledge/intent on the part of the superior ('should have known') and (ii) by way of loosening the superiorsubordinate relationship (through a broad reading of 'commission' or 'subordinate').
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The first two form of command responsibility relate to the ICC context; the second to the ICTY context. Secondly, neither in international statutory nor in international case-law, is command responsibility formulated and recognised as a separate offence.
The nature of command responsibility at both the ICC and the ICTY can be best characterized as parallel liability. As such, command responsibility has traits of both a separate offence and criminal participation. As such it captures the mode of liability variant as parallels of subordinate and superior responsibility that coincide. In the separate offence format, on the other hand, the parallels stay apart but they come together in the sentence. The qualification of 'parallel liability', used by Nehrlich in the ICC context, also accords with ICTY law. We are reminded of the ICTY Appeals Chamber ruling in Hadžihasanović where it was held that under article 7(3) both the gravity of the underlying crime as well as the 89 See Weigend, supra note 65, at 78. 90 One could identify a third way: by regarding command responsibility as premised on a duty to prevent future crimes; where a successor-superior fails to submit the matter to competent authorities. The 3 rd form of actus reus or countermeasure in article 28 of the ICC Statute could be viewed as such (and has been viewed as such by national legislatures). 'Submitting to the competent authorities' would then not be regarded as an alternative for 'repress', as was suggested by the Pre-Trial Chamber in Bemba (Bemba Confirmation Decision, para. 440) but as a separate failure to punish based on a prospective duty. See further section 4.1 superior's own conduct count towards the sentence. 
Evolving Liability
Having determined that command responsibility in the context of ICTY law can be characterized as parallel liability, and having described how the parallel tracks have widened through the broad interpretation of article 7(3), the question arises how the tracks can be kept together to prevent command responsibility from straying into a form of collective responsibility. One way of preventing a (further) broadening of command responsibility beyond the limits of personal culpability, would be to bolster the knowledge element. Instead of a broad 'had reason to know' requirement 92 it would have to be proved that the superior knew of the subordinate's conduct/acts, which includes his/her participation in crimes. A positive knowledge requirement could compensate for a remote linkage between superiors and the underlying crimes. Thus, in case of command responsibility for crimes committed by anonymous perpetrators in which the subordinate participated, it would have to be shown that alongside effective control over the subordinate, the commander knew that his/her subordinate was about to become, or had been, involved in such crimes. Insisting on a strict mens rea/knowledge element can be regarded as maintaining a balance between the three elements underlying the theory of command responsibility. Broadening the superiorsubordinate relationship means narrowing the knowledge element. There is a hydraulic relationship between the elements, which in Čelebići had equal weight.
How to view command responsibility as a basis for sentencing a superior for crimes that a subordinate participated in rather than commit him/herself? In my view a sentencing discount is appropriate when there is a very lose connection to the underlying crime. As with negligent superior responsibility, moral blameworthiness lies first and foremost in a superior's (own) failure to prevent or punish/repress. Such omission liability is generally less worthy of punishment than the underlying crime.
Regarding superior responsibility as parallel liability is helpful in constructing a sentencing discount. We do not need to interpret superior responsibility at the ICTY as a separate offence to justify a reduced sentence, as the Trial Chamber did in Hadžihasanović. 91 See supra note 58 92 Where "sufficiently alarming information putting a superior on notice of the risk that crimes might subsequently be carried out by his subordinates and justifying further inquiry is sufficient to hold a superior The subordinate's offence can be taken as point of reference and a certain portion can be deduced from the sentence that would attach to the principal crime.
Concluding observations
Looking back on a decade of ICTY case law on command responsibility starting with
Čelebići, and evaluating the Tribunal's legacy with respect to this liability theory, one has to conclude that ICTY jurisprudence has been instrumental in developing this concept. Its This is not to say that ICTY case law has no flaws and that other courts should follow it uncritically. Command responsibility is one of the most complex liability theories in international law. Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute, and the case law that ensues from it do not do justice to the complexities of this liability theory. Moreover, its nature remains ambiguous and subject to debate. This is for a large part down to the text of the provision in the ICTY Statute, which in its one-dimensional -mode of liabilitywording incapable of providing for a separate offence interpretation.
* * *
